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Operation Bodenplatte (Baseplate), launched on 1 January 1945, was an attempt by the Luftwaffe to cripple Allied air forces in the Low Countries during the Second World War. The goal of ''Bodenplatte'' was to gain air superiority during the stagnant stage of the Battle of the Bulge so that the German Army and ''Waffen-SS'' forces could resume their advance. The operation was planned for 16 December 1944, but was delayed repeatedly due to bad weather until New Year’s Day, the first day that happened to be suitable.〔Girbig 1975, p. 74.〕 Secrecy for the operation was so tight that not all German ground and naval forces had been informed of the operation and some units suffered casualties from friendly fire. British signals intelligence (Ultra) recorded the movement and buildup of German air forces in the region, but did not realise that an operation was imminent. The operation achieved some surprise and tactical success, but was ultimately a failure. A great many Allied aircraft were destroyed on the ground but replaced within a week. Allied aircrew casualties were quite small, since the majority of Allied losses were empty planes sitting on the ground. The Germans, however, lost many pilots that they could not readily replace.〔Caldwell 2007, p. 262.〕 Post-battle analysis suggests only 11 of the Luftwaffe's 34 air combat ''Gruppen'' made attacks on time and with surprise.〔Caldwell 2007, p. 262.〕 The operation failed to achieve air superiority, even temporarily, while the German ground forces continued to be exposed to Allied air attack. ''Bodenplatte'' was the last large-scale strategic offensive operation mounted by the Luftwaffe during the war.〔〔Franks 1994, no page (inside cover)〕 ==Background== The armies of the Western Allies were supported by the Allied Air Forces as they advanced across Western Europe in 1944. The Royal Air Force (RAF) and its Second Tactical Air Force—under the command of Air Marshal Arthur Coningham—moved No. 2 Group RAF, No. 83 Group RAF, No. 84 Group RAF and No. 85 Group RAF to continental Europe in order to provide constant close air support. The RAF harassed the German air, sea and ground forces by hitting strong points and interdicting their supply lines while reconnaissance units apprised the Allies of German movements. With Allied air superiority, the German Army could not operate effectively. The ''Luftwaffe'', however, found it difficult to provide effective air cover for the German Army. Although German aircraft production peaked in 1944 the ''Luftwaffe'' was critically short of pilots and fuel, and lacked experienced combat leaders.〔Franks 1994, p. 10.〕 The land battles moved towards the River Rhine, to the east of which lay the German heartland. Most of France had been liberated, as had the Belgian cities Brussels and Antwerp. Although Operation Market Garden had failed in 1944, by 1945 the Allies had overrun most of the southern Netherlands and the Scheldt Estuary. As the ground forces moved across Europe, the Allied tactical air forces moved into new bases on the continent, to continue providing close support. The only limiting factor for the Allies was the weather. As winter came, the rains and mud turned airfields into quagmires, so large-scale air and land operations came to a halt.〔Franks 1994, pp. 10–11.〕 The situation might well have continued until the spring thaw had the German High Command (''Oberkommando der Wehrmacht'') not launched ''Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein'' (Operation ''Watch on the Rhine'', or "Rhine Watch") on 16 December 1944. The land offensive was to improve the German military position by capturing Antwerp and separating the British Army from United States Army forces. Part of the planning for the German land operation required the attack to be conducted under the cover of bad winter weather, which kept the main Allied asset, the Tactical Air Forces, on the ground. It initially succeeded, but the weather also grounded the ''Luftwaffe'' for the most part. Nevertheless, the ''Luftwaffe'' did manage to put 500 aircraft into the air on 16 December, more than had been achieved for a long time. This first day had been the originally planned date for the strike against Allied airfields, named Operation ''Bodenplatte''.〔Price 2001, p. 113.〕 However, the weather proved particularly bad and operations were shut down.〔Franks 1994, p. 11.〕 The offensive achieved surprise and much initial success. To counter the attack from the air, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) handed operational control of its XXIX Tactical Air Command and part of its Ninth Air Force, under the command of Major General Hoyt Vandenberg, to the RAF and Arthur Coningham. On 23 December, the RAF Second Tactical Air Force provided the American forces with much needed support, and helped prevent a German capture of Malmedy and Bastogne. This left the Germans with only the logistical bottleneck of St. Vith to support their operations. The German attack faltered.〔Franks 1994, p. 11.〕 The ''Luftwaffe'' had been far from absent over the front in December. It flew several thousand sorties over the theatre. Its encounters with the RAF and USAAF had meant heavy losses in ''matériel'' and pilots. On the eight days of operations between 17 and 27 December 1944, 644 fighters were lost and 227 damaged. This resulted in 322 pilots killed, 23 captured and 133 wounded. On the three days of operations 23–25 December, 363 fighters were destroyed. None of the ''Geschwaderkommodore'' (Wing Commanders) expected any large-scale air operations by the end of the month.〔Manrho & Pütz 2004, p. 10.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Operation Bodenplatte」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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